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-vs.-
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WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and 
GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises from the Industrial Commission's 
denial of plaintiff's claim for benefits under the W ark-
men's Compensation Statutes of Utah. The claim arose 
from an accident which happened on February 13,1955, at 
approximately eight miles west of Evanston, Wyoming on 
Highway 30S, when an automobile which plaintiff was 
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driving went out of control on an icy portion of the road 
and went off said road. Plaintiff was severely injured in 
said accident. 
There is no dispute as to the benefits which plaintiff 
would be allowed were his claim approved. The sole issue 
dealt with by the Industrial Commission and involved in 
this appeal is whether or not plaintiff was an employee 
of the Wayne Rasmussen Company under the Workmen's 
Compensation laws of Utah. 
The first hearing before the Industrial Commission 
in this matter was held on October 17, 1956, before the 
Honorable Robert J. Shaughnessy, Referee . .At the out-
set it was stated by the Referee (R. 11) : 
"As a result of an off-the-record discussion, 
the parties have stipulated that the sole issue to be 
determined at this hearing is whether or not there 
was a contract of employment existing between the 
Defendant Wayne Rasmussen Company and the 
.Applicant ShermanS. Dalton." 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the hearing on October 17, 
1956, dealt solely with evidence relating to the question of 
whether or not the plaintiff was an employee at the time 
of said accident. .As a matter of fact counRel for defend-
ants objected to the plaintiff testifying as t:o his hospital 
treatment and injuries for the reason that this hearing 
was concerned only with the facts concerning plaintiff's 
employment status (R. 22). 
The evidence showed that Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany at the time in question was a new and used car 
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dealer in Ogden, Utah, having the franchise for Stude-
baker. The plaintiff had formerly been employed by this 
company as a mechanic in the year 1952 and later when 
the business was sold to Richard Baxter. At the time 
the business was re-acquired by the Wayne Rasmussen 
Company the plaintiff, together with John Porter, bought 
the shop equipment and parts and leased the back part of 
the Rasmussen Company building forming a partner-
ship in the automobile repair and maintenance business. 
The garage business of Dalton & Porter was separate and 
apart from the business of the. Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany. A great deal of the business of Dalton and Porter 
consisted of servicing new and used cars sent to them by 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company. It appeared that the 
Wayne Rasmussen Company had to maintain a front of 
appearing to own and operate a garage in connection with 
its business for the purpose of being able to keep its fran-
chise. However, the evidence showed that the two busi-
nesses were separate and distinct. 
As a regular part of the Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany business, it was necessary to purchase used cars 
at some distance from Ogden, frequently in Wyoming and 
Idaho, and to bring said cars back to Ogden for the pur-
pose of re-sale. Prior to February 13, 1955 the said com-
pany had customarily used regular employees to proceed 
to various places where used cars were purchased and to 
drive these cars back to its place of business at Ogden. 
Two regular employees by the names of A. J. Hansen and 
Scotty Metheny were customarily used for this service 
and sometimes Wayne Rasmussen himself would render 
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such services (R. 46-47). Also sometimes Mr. Naylor, 
who was in charge of buying and wholesaling used cars 
for the Wayne Rasmussen Company, and Mr. Rasmussen 
"would go out together and they would buy cars and other 
times Mr. Naylor would go out, sometimes to New Mexico, 
sometimes to Arizona, sometimes to Wyoming, and then 
he would hire people to get these cars in." (R. 47). 
On February 11, 1955, plaintiff was approached by 
Mr. Naylor at his place of business and asked if he and his 
partner could go to Rock Springs and bring two cars 
in for the Wayne Rasmussen Company. At that time 
Mr. Dalton informed Mr. Naylor that he would talk to 
his partner and let him know. At the same time, Mr. 
Naylor informed Mr. Dalton that this was an emergency 
for the reason that they had no one else to pick up the 
two cars. The following morning, February 12, a Satur-
day, at approximately between 9 :30 and 10 :00 A.M., 
plaintiff told Naylor that he and his partner would go, 
and Naylor informed him that he would find out about the 
bus and make arrangements. In regard to the remunera-
tion to be paid for the services the plaintiff testified (R. 
18): 
"Q. Was anything said as to any remuneration 
that you would receive for this trip~ 
A. Oh, he said he could pay $25.00 to get the 
cars back here and that's all he could pay. 
Q. And did he give you the $25.00 ~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And were you to get the bus tickets with that 
money~ 
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A. We bought the bus tickets out of that money, 
yes. 
Q. And the $25.00 was for the two of you~ 
A. For the two of us and the bus tickets." 
Shortly after the conversation aforesaid, Naylor in-
formed plaintiff as to the time of departure of the bus 
and gave him directions as to where to go after arriving 
at Rock Springs to pick up the cars. He also instructed 
plaintiff to fill the cars with gas and to charge the gas 
to the Wayne Rasmussen Company. Furthermore, Naylor 
informed Dalton that if they had any trouble on the 
way to pay for it and bring the bill, that the money would 
be refunded (R. 18). In this later conversation, Naylor 
stated that he was very happy they could go, that some 
people couldn't be depended upon to get the cars back. 
Naylor gave dealers' plates to plaintiff and his partner 
to use on the automobiles after they picked them up. 
Plaintiff and his partner caught the bus from Ogden 
at approximately between 2 and 3 p.m. on Saturday, 
February 12, and arrived at Rock Springs at approxi-
mately 7 P.M. After arriving, they went to the place 
where they had been directed to go, and the person they 
were to see was waiting for them. They got in the cars 
and signed the tickets for the gasoline that had been put 
in said cars and then left, proceeding to a cafe for dinner. 
After eating, they started for Ogden. Plaintiff believes 
that at some point between Rock Springs and Evanston 
the oil was checked in one of the two cars and a quart of 
oil added. Plaintiff and his partner stopped in Evanston 
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for a few minutes and had some coffee, then proceeded 
towards Ogden to the point of the accident. The accident 
happened at approximately 2 A.M. on February 13 (R.l). 
Plaintiff further testified that the two bus tickets for 
himself and his partner had cost between $4.00 and $5.00 
(R. 41). The bookkeeper for Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany, Mr. A. N. Purkey, witnessed part of the conversa-
tion in regard to the transaction aforesaid and also testi-
fied as to how such transactions were handled on the 
books of the company. He stated that in such a trans-
action a check would be made out and charged to the 
cost of the particular automobile which was being brought 
back. He remembers that as a result of the conversa-
tion, arrangements were made for him to give them a 
check for $25.00, the instructions being given by either 
Mr. Naylor or Mr. Rasmussen. He then issued the check 
and gave it to Mr. Dalton (R. 49-50). Mr. Purkey further 
testified that regular employees on a salary and commis-
sion basis who performed the same service were paid 
money in addition to their salary and that any additional 
expenses incurred and which they paid out of their 
pockets would be rein1bursed (R.. 51). Furthermore, Mr. 
Purkey reme1nbers that a bill for gas and oil was found 
in the pocket of plaintiff and that this bill was paid by 
the Wayne Has1nussen Company (R. 52). At (R. 63) 
Mr. Purkey testified as follows: 
"Q. All of these ear transactions, deals like tllis, 
were - Do I understand you right, that they 
were all handled exactly the srune. 
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A. Yes. It made no difference whether Porter 
and Dalton went after a car or Metheny and 
Hansen, or any of the other employees. It 
was so much plus expenses and that would be 
added to the cost of the car." 
In answer to questions by the referee the plaintiff 
testified as follows (R. 42) : 
"Q. Just one or two questions, Mr. Dalton. Was 
anything said about whether or not you should 
account for this $25.00 after you returned~ 
A. It was said that if we had any additional ex-
pense we would be reimbursed for it and any-
thing we needed to charge to Wayne Ras-
mussen Company. 
Q. I see. 
A. And we'd be reimbursed for it. 
Q. So the $25.00 you received was for the bus 
tickets and the balance was for you and Mr. 
Porter personally1 
A. V\Tell, yes." 
:Mr. Purkey also testified that in regard to such trans-
actions as the one involved in this case, the payment to 
the person involved was always a cash transaction and 
was never handled by debits and credits (R. 61, 62). 
Approximately one year after the hearing, the 
referee rendered recommended findings of fact and con-
clusions of law which were adopted by the Industrial 
Commission on October 9, 1957 (R. 71, 72). In said find-
ings the referee stated in part as follows (R. 72): 
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''The applicant and his partner were ap-
proached by Mr. Naylor, the sales manager of 
the defendant, requesting the applicant and his 
partner to go to Rock Springs, Wyoming, and 
return with two cars for the defendant. The ap·-
plicant and his partner, Mr. Porter, agreed to go. 
They were to receive $25.00 for the trip, out of 
which would come the expense of two bus tickets 
to Rock Springs. The defendant paid for all ga.:; 
and oil and would reimburse the applicant for anv 
money spent on repairs of the two cars. · 
"The applicant left on the bus according to 
instructions given him by the defendant's agent. 
arrived in Rock Springs that same evening, picked 
up the cars according to the instructions, and on 
the return trip on February 13, 1955 the applicant 
lost control of the car as a result of icy roads and 
the resultant crash caused his injuries. 
"The principal issue is whether or not the 
applicant was employed by the defendant. It ap-
pears to the Referee that the status of employment 
must exist. The record shows that the above pro-
cedure was regularly followed by the defendant in 
sending their full tunes salesn1an on such trips so 
the type of work "''~as not casual or unusual for the 
defendant. It could not be in the nature of a joint 
venture since the applicant had no interest in the 
propert~~ as the result of the sale. It appears that 
his only interest \nls in returning with the cars 
af' requested and taking as his wage the difference 
behn•pn $1 ~.50 and the price of the bus tickets. 
;\~f'mning $3.00 as the price of the bus ticket, the 
applieant "\Ya.s earning at least $9.50 per day for 
hif' work. ;'\< * * 
.. It \Ya8 not unreasonable to find that the ap-
plicant was in fact an mnployee of the defendant 
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on February 13, 1955, and that the accident on 
the highway arose out of or in the course of his 
employment." 
Subsequent to this, on November 12, 1957, counsel 
for defendant wrote a letter to Mr. Otto A. Wiesley, 
Chairman of the Industrial Commission requesting a 
re-hearing. Counsel requested the re-hearing to re-
determine the question of whether or not there was a con-
tract of employment existing between defendant and the 
applicant. Also, counsel requested a re-hearing to deter-
mine if the medical expenses incurred by the applicant 
were reasonable (R. 77). On November 26, 1957, the In-
dustrial Commission granted the request for re-hearing 
of defendants. Plaintiff resisted the granting of the re-
hearing and on December 5, 1957, the chairman of the 
Industrial Commission sent a letter to counsel for plain-
tiff (R. 81). In this letter the chairman stated as follows: 
"We acknowledge receipt of your Argument in 
Opposition to Rehearing. 
"We have read the transcript. There is no 
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses. 
As usual the order specifies reasonable medical 
and l)_ospital expenses. Always these expenses 
must be in line with our established fee schedule. 
Therefore, usually, there is no dispute. In this 
case a very large bill has been submitted to the 
defendants. They are entvtled to have the commis-
sion determine thi's issue. 
"The case will be set for rehearing early in 
January." 
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The rehearing was held on February 10,1958. At this 
hearing the only proceedings held had to do with the in-
troduction of medical bills. There was no further evidence 
introduced regarding the employment question. However, 
the defendants submitted a written argument which dealt 
exclusively with the employment question (R. 101-110) 
and plaintiff submitted a written argument in answer 
to the one submitted by defendants (R. 11-119). On .April 
2, 1958, the Industrial Commission rendered a decision 
( R. 96). In this decision the Industrial Commission re-
versed its former holding and stated in part as follows: 
"The $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner, 
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages. 
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the 
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Ober-
hansly vs. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P. 2d 1093, 
5 Utah 2d 15 is controlling. 
"We therefore find that applicant was not an 
e1nployee of defendant, \Y ayne Rasmussen Com-
pany on February 13, 1955, the date of the accident 
. and injury, but that he ~vas either a volunteer or 
an independent contractor. 
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the 
application is denied." 
The Plaintiff subn1itted a petition for rehearing on 
April 23, 195S, (R. 97-100) which was denied by the In-
dustrial Conunission on July 17, 1958 (R. 126). 
Plaintiff is appealing frmn the arbitrary action taken 
by the Industrial Connnission reversing its prior ruling 
on plaintiff's elaim with no additional evidence having 
been taken. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE REVERSAL OF ITS OWN FINDINGS BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRI-
CIOUS AND AGAINST LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION EXCEEDED THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE 
RE-HEARING WAS GRANTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE REVERSAL OF ITS OWN FINDINGS BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRI-
CIOUS AND AGAINST LAW. 
It is well established law in Utah that the question of 
whether or not an applicant is an employee is jurisdic-
tional, and, therefore, the Supreme Court is required 
to examine the evidence to see whether or not it pre-
ponderates against the conclusions of the Industrial 
Commission. See Christean v. Industrial Commission, 
(1948), 113 U. 451, 196 P.2d 502, and Sommerville v. In-
dustrial Commiss~on (1948), 113 U. 504, 196 P.2 718. 
The action taken by the Industrial Commission in 
the case at bar strikes at the roots of the Workmen's 
Compensation Laws and is violative of the general philo-
sophy pertaining to said laws as stated by Justice Wolfe 
in the case of Christean v. Industrial Commvssion, (1948), 
supra, at page 517. 
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"It may be pertinent here to repeat the now 
familiar principle that the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act should be liberally construed to accom-
plish the beneficent purposes of the act. In close 
or doubtful cases that construction should be ap-
plied which includes rather than excludes particu-
lar classes of employees from the benefits of the 
act." 
Certainly if the foregoing language is to be given 
any meaning whatsoever in this State the action taken 
by the Industrial Commission in the case at bar must be 
disapproved. After having the case under advisement for 
ahnost a year the referee made specific findings of fact 
(1) that since the procedure involved in this case was 
regularly followed by the defendant in sending out its 
full time salesmen on such trips that the type of work 
was not casual or unusual for the defendant; (2) that the 
trip could not be in the nature of a joint venture since 
the applicant had no interest in the property as the result 
of the sale and, (3) that applicant and his partner were 
paid a wage for the services which they performed which 
consisted of $12.50 less the price of a bus ticket which 
amounted to at least $9.50 per day for the work, with the 
resulting conrlusion that the applicant was an employee 
of defendant at the tiJ.ue of the accident. The Industrial 
Commission then went on to grant a re-hearing in the 
e:uw upon a request by counsel for defendants to re-
determine the question of einploy""Inent without said coun-
~el stating any specific reason whatsoever. \Vithout tak-
ing any additional evidence at the re-hearing as to the 
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question of employment the Industrial Commission arbi-
trarily changed its finding that the applicant was per-
forming a service :for a wage to a finding that the $25.00 
paid to applicant and his partner was expense money 
rather than wages. The only justification that the In-
dustrial Commission attempted for this arbitrary action 
was that it asserted that the case at bar was on all fours 
with the case of Oberhansley v. Travelers Insurance Com-
pany, 5 U. 2d 15, 295 P. 2d 1093. It appears that the In-
dustrial Commission changed a finding of fact on the 
basis of the facts and law of an entirely different lawsuit. 
The case at bar is entirely distinguishable from the 
Oberhansley case. In the Oberhansley case the plaintiff 
recovered a judgment from the owner of an automobile 
business for injuries received when riding in a car driven 
by said owner. The plaintiff then sued the insurance 
company to collect on the owner's liability policy and the 
insurance company contended that plaintiff was excluded 
from the policy for the reason that he was an employee 
under Workmen's Compensation Law. The plaintiff's 
brother was a partner in this automobile business, and 
the evidence showed that the business was in financial 
difficulty. The plaintiff had delivered automobiles for 
the company on other occasions, and it was admitted by 
all parties involved that on the other occasions as well 
as on the one in question the plaintiff was rendering a 
service merely as a favor and a gratituity. Furthermore, 
it was admitted by all parties that the $10.00 which the 
plaintiff received was merely expense money and that it 
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was understood as such. The trial Court held from this 
evidence that there was no employee-employer relation-
ship between the automobile company and the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the trial court 
mainly on the basis that the trial court had held there was 
no consideration paid to plaintiff for the service which 
he rendered. The court appeared to rely on this fact as a 
basis for affirrning the finding that the automobile com-
pany did not have the right to control the plaintiff in the 
1nanner in which the work was accomplished. It was fur-
ther pointed out that the plaintiff had a motive for de-
siring to perform the service as a favor for the reason 
that his brother was a partner in the business and that the 
business was in financial difficulty. The Oberhansley 
case involved a situation where the Supreme Court held 
that once having found that the service rendered was a 
gratuit)~, it was reasonable for the trial court to hold 
that the plaintiff was not an employee. The Industrial 
Commission in the case at bar used the Oberhansley case 
not as a precedent for a legal conclusion but as the basis 
for reversing its 0\\~1 findings of fact that the plaintiff 
had rendered the service not as a gratuity but for a wage. 
The evidence in the record in the case at bar estab-
lishes ovPrwhehuingl~~ the fact that the plaintiff and his 
partner wPre perfornung the service involved for a wage 
:md not as a gratuit~'· Not only did the parties involved 
in the tran:-;adion in question testify that the only thing 
tlmt. had to emnc out of the $25.00 was a bus ticket and 
that any additional expenses would be reimbursed, but 
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the bookkeeper testified. that in all transactions such as 
this the person involved was given so much money plus 
expenses. When questioned by counsel for defendants on 
cross exan1ination the bookkeeper stated that the same 
formula was used for regular employees performing 
this service the same as it was used for Dalton and Por-
ter. There was no evidence put in the record to contradict 
in any way the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff and 
his partner performed the service for the money that 
would remain after the bus tickets were purchased. Any 
other finding based on this record would have been utter-
ly ridiculous. There was nothing whatsoever shown in 
the case at bar indicating that plaintiff and his partner 
had any motive for desiring to give defendant a gratituity 
and for desiring to undertake an onerous burden of tak-
ing a bus trip to Rock Springs, Wyoming and spending 
half the night driving back to Ogden over a weekend for 
no remuneration. There was nothing shown in the record 
that plaintiff had such a great love and devotion for the 
Wayne Rasmussen Company that he would desire to 
undergo such a hardship for no money at all. It seems 
peculiar that the Industrial Commission would attribute 
such a noble and generous motive to plaintiff for the 
purpose of denying compensation, especially when there 
was nothing in the record showing that plaintiff is such 
a big hearted person. 
The Industrial Commission in its final decision would 
not even attempt to state definitely what it did consider 
the plaintiff to be, but stated equivocally that he was 
either a volunteer or an independent contractor. In its 
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first ruling on this case the Industrial Commission held 
that plaintiff was neither a volunteer nor an independent 
contractor and appeared to rely heavily on the fact that 
the procedure followed by plaintiff was a procedure regu-
larly fo~lowed by defendant in sending out its full time 
salesmen. 
In arguing whether or not Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany had the right of controlling plaintiff in the perform-
ance of this service it seems obvious that it had the same 
right of control over plaintiff that it had over its full 
time employees who performed similar services as an 
integral part of its business. It would be very difficult 
to hold that defendant had the right of control in one 
case and not the other. It is difficult to see how anyone 
could argue that the \Yayne Rasmussen Company did 
not have the right to control the performance of the 
services. The Wayne Rasmussen Company owned the 
automobiles and gave plaintiff and his partner definite 
instructions where to go, when to go, who to see, and to 
drive the automobiles back to the Company after they 
were obtained. Certainly the type of service which plain-
tiff was rendering was not one requiring an unusual de-
gree of skill which is the case of 1nost independent con-
tractors. Obviously the plaintiff and his partner had no 
right to substitute anyone else for then1selves such as 
uwst independent contractors have. It will be remember-
ed that tlH• testinwn~· showed that \Vayne Rasmussen 
Compan~· was relying on the reliability of plaintiff and 
!1 is partner with which it was well acquainted. This was 
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not the type of work which has no connection with the 
business and which is usually done by outside parties, but 
on the contrary was a regular and vital function of the 
business of Wayne Rasmussen Company. It seems quite 
obvious that an automobile dealer cannot function without 
having automobiles to sell. The fact that the job which 
Dalton and Porter were doing was one which was regu-
larly and rnost usually performed by regular employees 
for a wage should be determinative of the question of 
employment, for it would be difficult to argue that had 
one of the regular employees been injured as was Dalton 
that he would not be considered an employee under Work-
men's Compensation. 
For assistance to the court the following cases are 
cited to substantiate some of the legal propositions here-
tofore stated. See Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 
65 U. 168, 235 P. 884, and Gogoff v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 77 U. 355, 296 P. 229, for the proposition that an 
employee cannot put another person in his place without 
the consent of the employer whereby an independent con-
tractor can. 
The applicant was held to be an employee and not an 
independent contractor in the case of Southern Pacific 
Company v. IndustriJal Commission, 71 U. 248, 264 P. 
965, where the applicant was hired by the railroad com-
pany's section foreman to cut noxious weeds on a section 
of the company's right of way in Weber County. The 
applicant was to furnish his own team and mower and 
was hired at a daily wage of $6.50. He was instructed 
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where to cut the weeds and when to change to other 
places. Also, it was pointed out that no one told applicant 
how to operate the team and mower. 
The case of Utah F~re Clay Company v. Industrial 
Comm~ssion, 86 U. 1, 40 P. 2d 183, involved a situation 
where the employer entered into an oral contract with 
R. S. James to furnish trucks and drivers to do all of 
his transportation and delivery service. James furnished 
two trucks and drivers who reported daily to the ship-
ping clerk of the company, and deliveries were made 
under his direction. The court held in this case that the 
truck drivers were employees of the company under the 
\V orkmen's Compensation statutes. It seems difficult to 
distinguish these latter two cases from the case at bar in 
regard to the right of control test or any of the other 
tests spoken of by the court in various cases. 
Although it appears frmn the Industrial Commis-
sion's latest decision that no assertion was 1nade to the 
effect that plaintiff was a casual employee as spoken of 
in Section 35-1-43 Utah Code Ann. 1953, it seems advis-
able to discuss this aspect of the case briefl~~ due to the 
fad that defendant has contended, an10ng other things, 
t]w t plaintiff "~as such a casual en1ployee. 
In t h0 ease of Palle Y. Industrval Commission of 
[7tah, 7!) F. +7. 7 P. 2d :28+, it was pointed out that to 
exeludP an f'Hlplo~~ee the emploYinent n1ust not only be 
emmal hut n1ust also not be in the usual course of the 
trad<' or bnsinPss of the e1nployer, and it was stated: 
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"This, as it seems, but emphasizes the fact 
that a casual or occasional employment of the 
usual course of the trade or business of the em-
ployer does not exclude the employee." 
And further: 
"Further, the employment of Nelson to take 
the place of Kenneth Jensen while absent, may not 
be said to constitute a mere 'casual' employment, 
but was a regular employment in the business. He 
continued to be such an employee until he was 
discharged or left the service." 
It can be seen from this case that an employment, regard-
less of duration, if in the regular course of business can-
not be a casual employment under the Workmen's Com-
pensation statutes, and that any employment which ac-
complishes the work of a regular employee who is unable 
to work is not a casual employment. 
In Utah Copper Co. v. Industri'al Commission, 57 U. 
118, 193 P. 24, the deceased was a farmer operating a 
farm through which a canal ran. The water was used 
for irrigation and stock and was owned by a canal com-
pany. However, Utah Copper Company used water from 
the canal the year around in mining and milling processes. 
The Utah Copper Company kept the canal clean and in 
repair and frequently hired local men for repair work. 
With the authority of the company the canal boss hired 
the decedent for certain repair work in which work he 
received his injury. It was held that obtaining water was 
necessary to the business of the copper company and 
anyone repairing the ditch was, therefore, engaged in the 
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usual business of the employer and that, furthermore, 
it was not casual employment. It was stated at page 
29: 
"The intent of the legislation in question was 
to create a new or additional burden upon the 
industries of this state not heretofore horne by 
such industries, and to establish a system whereby 
the industries should bear the cost qf providing for 
those injured while engaged in such industries or 
the dependents of those sustaining injuries result-
ing in death. Such being the object sought, it is, 
in our judgment, more in consonance with that 
purpose to conclude that it was not the intention 
of the Legislature to exclude from the operation 
of the act any one engaged in work necessarily 
required in the usual prosecution of such indus-
tries, and that the duration of such employment or 
the infrequency of the same ought not to control 
the courts in determining whether the employment 
was casual or otherwise. If the employment was 
essential and was required in the prosecution of 
the regular business of the industry, the industry, 
in order to carry out and effectuate the purpose 
of the act, should pay for any injuries sustained. 
The statutes of this state require the courts to 
give to legislative enactn1ents a liberal construc-
tion, with a ·vie"\v to effectuate the purpose sought 
by the Legislature." 
In t1w case of Capitol Cleaners and Dyers v. In-
dustrial Commission. 85 {T. 295, 39 P. 2d 681, the defend-
ant opPrated a. business of cleaning and dyeing of wearing 
apparel, and decided for reasons being conducive to the 
:weomplishment of its purposes and to pronwte its busi-
ness to havf' a sn1okestack and certain radiators and pipes 
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painted. The defendant hired the deceased to do it on an 
hourly wage with tools and supplies furnished by the 
company. In all respects except as to the actual mechan-
ics of the painting the work was to be done under the 
supervision and subject to the direction of the employer. 
Furthermore, the deceased had done the same type of 
work for the company before under similar arrangements. 
It was held at page 682: 
"The work to be accomplished being in fur-
therance of and necessary to the business in which 
the company was engaged, the employment was 
not casual within the meaning of R. S. Utah 1933, 
42-1-41. Since the work was to have been done 
under the supervision and subject to the direction 
of the employer, Mr. Reusser, with respect there-
to, was not an independent contractor within the 
intent and meaning of R.S. Utah 1933, 42-1-40." 
In regard to the general question of employee-
independent contractor, a recent case which may be of 
assistance to the court is the case of Plewe Construction 
Company v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 U. 375, 
242 P. 2d 561. In this case a general contractor construct-
ing a building hired partners to shingle the roof for so 
much a square. The contractor instructed the partners 
as to how the work was to be done, furnished the material 
and supervised the work. The partners hired a carpenter 
to help them, and the carpenter was injured in this work. 
It was held that the carpenter was the employee of the 
contractor under the Workmen's Compensation Law. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Com-
mission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reversing 
former findings of fact based on the entire evidence in 
the record on the sole ground of the Oberhansley case 
which has an entirely distinguishable fact situation as 
heretofore pointed out. 
POINT II. 
THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION EXCEEDED THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE 
RE-HEARING WAS GRANTED. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein it 
was agreed between the parties and the referee at the 
time of the first hearing that the hearing would be de-
voted exclusively to the question of whether or not the 
plaintiff was an employee. It was agreed at that time that 
there would probably be no dispute as to the medical bills 
and wage benefits should plaintiff receive an award. 
As previously stated, subsequent to the first decision 
of the Industrial Cmn1nission granting benefits to plain-
tiff, counsel for defendants sent an ex parte letter to Otto 
A. "'\Viesley, the chainnan of the Industrial Connnission, 
in which he requested a re-hearing to re-determine 
'vhether or not there was a contract of employment exist-
ing between the defendant "'\Yayne R.as1nussen Company 
and the applicant, Shennan S. Dalton, at the tin1e of the 
inju r)· and also to deternrine if the n1edical expenses in-
euiTed hr the applicant were reasonable. When the In-
dustrial Cmnmission granted the re-hearing, counsel for 
1 )lain tiff objected for the reason he had been given no 
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notice and had not been given an opportunity to submit 
an argument opposing the granting of the re-hearing and 
had been denied due process of law (R. 75). Subsequent-
ly, counsel for plaintiff also submitted an argument in 
opposition to the re-hearing on the two grounds as stated 
in the letter of counsel for defendant and especially in 
regard to the employment question, for the reason that 
the matter had been thoroughly studied by the referee 
for almost a year before the decision was rendered (R. 
79-80). 
In response to this argument in opposition of re-
hearing, counsel for plaintiff received a letter dated De-
cember 5, 1957, from the Industrial Commission of Utah 
and signed by its chairman, Otto A. Wiesley. This letter 
stated as follows: 
"We acknowledge receipt of your Argument 
in Opposition to Re-hearing. 
"We have read the transcript. There is no 
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses. 
As usual the order specifies reasonable medical 
and hospital expenses. Always these expense8 
must be in line with our established fee schedule. 
Therefore, usually, there is no dispute. In this 
case a very large bill has been submitted to the 
defendants. They are entitled to have the conl-
mission determine this issue. 
' 
"The case will be set for rehearing early in 
January." 
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Certainly, even a casual reading of this letter shows 
that the Industrial Commission was informing counsel 
that the re-hearing was granted for the sole purpose of 
establishing the reasonableness of the medical bills. As 
previously stated, the re-hearing was subsequently held 
and was limited to evidence as to the reasonableness of 
the medical bills. The Industrial Commission then pro-
ceeded in its subsequent decision to arbitrarily reverse its 
former findings of fact and decision without having taken 
any new evidence whatsoever and after having the origin-
al hearing under advisement for almost a year. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Com-
mission granted the re-hearing for the sole purpose of 
considering the reasonableness of the medical bills. The 
Industrial Conunission had no jurisdiction to then re-open 
the question of einploJinent which had been finally and 
definitey decided. 
It is respectfully subinitted that to allo"W the Indns-
t rial Conunission to grant a re-hearing for certain pnr-
po~('~ and then allow said Conunission to open up the 
n'-hearing- and reconsider other 1natters would be grossly 
unfair to litigants and would gi,~e the Industrial Com-
Jllission unlilllit!)d p!nn:r to ad arbitrarily and capricious-
}~· as it did in the case ~l t bar. Certaini~~. the rules of 
pro<'!'dure should be definite and certain so that appli-
<'ants and their :1ttorne~·s Ina~- rely on final decisions 
I 
Iliad<' hy the Industrial Counnission and not be subject 
to having tht> rug pulled out frmn under the~n. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission has the· duty to admin-
ister the Workmen's Compensation Laws fairly to ef-
fectuate the "beneficent purposes of the Act." The only 
protection a claimant has against arbitrary and capri-
cious action of the Industrial Commission is an appeal 
to this Court. This Court is urged to intervene when 
the Commission attempts to become a law unto itself. 
When the Industrial Commission attempts to establish 
its own empire and its own law contrary to the beneficent 
purpose of the Act, its actions should he stricken down. 
Such arbitrary, highhanded and illegal treatment 
as plaintiff received at the hands of the Industrial Com-
mission should not be tolerated. After taking a full year 
to arrive at a decision awarding compensation to plain-
tiff, the Commission suddenly, arbitrarily and illegally 
reversed itself and took away plaintiff's rightful award. 
This action was taken without new evidence or new law 
but solely on the basis of the peculiar facts of a different 
lawsuit. The Commission even exceeded its own stated 
purpose in granting the rehearing by considering the em-
ployment question. This question had been finally de-
termined and the rehearing for such question denied. The 
Commission had lost jurisdiction of the question of em-
ployment and had no power to arbitrarily open it up 
again and reverse former findings. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the action taken by 
the Industrial Commission in this case should be stricken 
down and plaintiff given his rightful award. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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